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THE INELIGIBILITY CLAUSE: AN HISTORICAL
APPROACH TO ITS INTERPRETATION
AND APPLICATION
INTRODUCTION

The position of trust and confidence which a public servant
occupies imposes upon him the obligation to act solely for the
benefit of the public.1 While this obligation does not appear
overly burdensome, man's historic lust for wealth and power 2
has fostered a cynicism in the public-at-large--a wariness of
people in high places. 3 The conventions which draft the laws of
our states share this inherent distrust of public officials. 4 As a
result, state constitutions often appear as patch-work designs
with threads of mistrust interwoven throughout the fabrics of
political organization.
Concern over the effect which undesirable influences exert
on the elected official's execution of his office surfaced promi-5
nantly at the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention in 1970.
This concern was particularly evident in the Convention's delib1. See generally Note, Conflict of Interests: State Government Employees, 47 VA. L. REV. 1034 (1961).
2. Benjamin Franklin noted that "[t] here are two passions which have
a powerful influence on the affairs of men.., ambition and avarice; the
love of power and the love of money." 1 M. FARRAND,THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 82 (1911) [hereinafter cited as M. FARRAND].

3. See S. GOVE & T. Krrsos, REVISION SuccEss: THE SIXTH ILLINOIS
CONsTIuTUIoNAL CONVENTION 13 (1974) [hereinafter cited as S. GovE & T.
Krrsos]; ("[T]he frequent scandals, in state and local governments, ....
have tended ... to foster a cynical attitude toward government."); see also
Tomasek, A Responsive and Responsible Twentieth Century Legislature, 48
N.D.L. REV. 258 (1972).
4. Omadhl, The Case for ConstitutionalRevision in North Dakota, 48
N.D.L. REV. 197, 199 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Omadhl] (the basic philosophy which underlies state constitutions is a suspicion of all government employees as being greedy, dishonest individuals who must be carefully
watched to protect the public from their selfish, corrupt motives); accord,
Miller, Dead Hand of the Past, 53 NAT'L Cvic REV. 183 (1968). "The basic
fact to appreciate about state constitutions is that they are designed not to
help government officials govern but to prevent them from picking the taxpayer's pockets."
5. S. Gov & T. Krrsos, supra note 3, at 13. For additional in-depth
analysis of the 1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention, see J. CoRNELrUs,
CONsTrrurION MAKING IN ILLINOIS 1818-1970, at 121 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as J. CORNEILUS]; E. GERTZ & J. PISCIOTrE, CHARTER FOR A NEW AGE: AN
INSIDE VIEW OF THE SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTIruTIONAL CONVENTION (1980)
[hereinafter cited as E. GERTZ &J. PISCIOTTE].
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erations over the manner in which individuals are chosen for appointive office. 6 Recognizing that a major flaw in the previous

state constitutions was the unequal balance between the executive and legislative branches, 7 the delegates wished to
strengthen the governor's office. 8 This goal may be achieved by
granting the governor greater input into the selection of those
who would serve under him.9 However, incidents such as the
patronage Cabinet of Andrew Jackson have instilled a desire to
place limitations on the executive's power to fill vacancies. With
these considerations before them, the Convention delegates
pursued its task of adding vigor to the governor's office without
giving him unbridled power in filling executive posts. 10
After vesting the appointive power in the governor,"1 the Illinois Convention changed two previously elective offices into appointive positions. 12 The delegates then considered what
6. See generally E. GERTZ &J. PISCIO'rrE, supra note 5, at 218-27; 3 RECORD OF THE PROCEEDINGS SIXTH IuLLNOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 125359 (1969-70) [hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGS].
7. S. GovE & T. Krrsos, supra note 3, at 3.
8. E. GERTZ & J. PISCIOrrE, supra note 5, at 216-19; see also J. CoRNELIus, supra note 5, at 158-60.
9. See generally J. CORNELrus, supra note 5, at 158-61. The two most
controversial measures examined by the Committee on the Executive Article during the 1970 Convention were (1) shortening the ballot, and (2) expanding the governor's veto power. E. GERTZ & J. PisCIOTrE, supra note 5,
at 218-19. The first measure, the "short-ballot," was proposed in an effort to
create greater cohesion in the administration of government. Advocates of
this proposal cited "the evils of voter cynicism, confusion, and ignorance;
unresponsive government; and control of elective offices by political bosses
...." as additional reasons for reducing the number of elective offices. Id.
at 220. The Convention considered removal of seven executive offices. See
3 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 6, at 1525-50.
The second measure was proposed by William Hanley, then legislative
counsel to Governor Ogilvie. Hanley noted that the veto power was an inherent attribute of a strong executive and suggested that this power be increased. His recommendation consisted to two "special vetoes": an
amendatory veto and a reduction veto. The amendatory veto gave the governor the power to partially veto or "amend" legislation rather than rejecting the bill in toto. The reduction veto allowed the governor to reduce
appropriations made by the General Assembly. Both vetoes could be overridden by a simple majority. E. GERTZ & J. PIsCIOTrE, supra note 5, at 21819.
10. The Committee on the Executive Article was leary of granting too
much power to the governor. E. GERTZ & J. PISCIOTrE, supra note 5, at 219.
Their skepticism reflected the belief held by many that the governor's office
could become the repository of too much patronage. Those delegates who
feared abuse of power by the [governor] were unwilling to accept the legislature as a sufficient check. . . ." Id. at 220.
11. See ILL. CONST. art. V, § 9.
12. See J. CORNELIUS, supra note 5, at 158-61. The 1970 Convention eliminated the elective office of superintendent of public instruction and replaced it with a state board of education with two appointive offices: chief
state school officer and executive officer for the board. In addition, the Convention also provided for the election of the governor and lieutenant gover-
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limitations should be placed on the governor's discretion in
filling vacancies, keeping in mind that too many restrictions hinder the efficient operation of state government. 13 After extensive deliberation, the Convention adopted tempered limitations
designed to prevent abuses of the appointive power, while still
allowing the governor flexibility in selecting the occupants of
important offices. 14 One such tempered restriction on the goverby the adoption of a less
nor's appointive power was imposed
5
restrictive ineligibility clause.'
The ineligibility clause limits the availability of elected state
legislators for appointive offices. In sister states, this clause appears in two forms. Some state constitutions absolutely exclude
16
a legislator from civil appointments during his elected term.
In most states, however, the ineligibility clause imposes only a
qualified restriction on civil appointments. These states disqualify a legislator from receiving appointment for the remainder of his elected term when (1) that office is created during his
term, or (2) the salary of that office is increased during his
term. 17 Both forms of the ineligibility clause have some disadnor as a team, thereby giving the governor more input in the selection of
that position's occupant.
13. See Omadhl, supra note 4, at 199; see also notes 44-45 and accompanying text infra.
14. In the long run, the Committee on the Executive Article really did
not make any revolutionary changes in the governor's power to fill vacancies. The most pronounced change was the greater selection from which
the governor could make appointments by lowering the age and residency
requirements, S. GovE &T. Krrsos, supra note 3, at 115, and by narrowing
the scope of the dual office holding and ineligibility clauses. See 6 PROCEEDINGS, Committee on the Legislative Article Proposal#1, supra note 6, at 1346.
15. See ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 2(e), 2 which provides that "[nJo member
of the general Assembly during the term for which he was elected or appointed shall be appointed to a public office which shall have been created
or the compensation for which shall have been increased by the General
Assembly during that term."
16. Sixteen states have an ineligiblity clause which absolutely forbids
legislators from receiving appointment to public office during their elected
term. They are: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Colorado,
Georgia, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming.
New Mexico also excludes legislators from appointment one year after
the expiration of their term, but only to an office which was created or the
salary of which was increased during the legislator's term. See N.M. CONST.

art. IV, § 28.

17. Twenty-six constitutions have qualified restrictions, as does the
Federal Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6, cl. 2. The twenty-six states
are: Alabama, Alaska, Deleware, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada,
New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. A dozen of these
state constitutions extend the provision's coverage to elective office as well.
See ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 5; KY. CONST. § 4+-MD. CONST. art. III, § 17; N.J.
CONST. art. IV, § 5, 1; N.Y. CONST. art II, § 7; OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 23; S.D.
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vantages. The absolute disqualification of legislators broadly
eliminates experienced public servants from executive offices.' 8
The "qualified restriction" form is narrower in scope, leaving
legislators and the governor susceptible to outside influences in
all but a few situations. 19 In addition, the "qualified restriction"
20
form is more difficult to apply and hence more easily evaded.
At the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention, the delegates adopted the "qualified" ineligibility clause over its more
restrictive counterpart. The Committee on the Legislative Article, the drafters of this provision, stated that the narrower form
was preferred for two reasons. First, the qualified restriction
conformed to the Convention's over-all desire to temper restrictions on the governor's powers. Second, and more important,
this form of ineligibility clause made the widest scope of talented individuals available for appointive offices. 2 ' The Committee believed that these factors outweighed the disadvantages
inherent in the "qualified restriction" form.
The Committee was nonetheless concerned over the manner in which the narrower form of the ineligibility clause would
be applied. Court cases from other jurisdictions revealed that
potential gray areas abounded. 22 A comparative analysis prepared for the Committee had likewise labeled the area of ineligibility "murky" at best.23 Therefore, in drafting the ineligibility

clause into the Illinois Constitution, the Committee resolved to
present a simple, straightforward provision which would give
CONST. art III, §

12; TEx. CONST. art. III, § 18; UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 7; WASH.
CONST. art. f1, § 13; W. VA. CONST. art IV, § 5; Wis. CONST. art IV, § 12.
Washington's ineligibility clause was recently revised by amendment
69 which allows a legislator's appointment to an office, the salary of which
was increased during his term. The legislator, however, is restricted to the
pre-existing level of compensation for his initial term of office. See WASH.
ONST. art. II, § 13 (amended 1979); see also note 124 infra.
18. G. BRADEN &R. COHN, THE ILLINOIS CONSTrUION: AN ANNOTATED
AND CoMpARATrvE ANALYSxS 176-78 (1969) [hereinafter cited as G. BRADEN &
R. COHN]. This was the argument presented by many of the delegates to
the Federal Constitutional Convention of 1787 against adopting an absolute
disqualification as the federal ineligibility clause. See notes 43-45 and ac-

companying text infra.
19. See notes 44-46 and accompanying text infra.
20. Despite its disadvantages, the Committee on the Legislative Article
preferred an ineligibility clause in its qualified form to absolute disqualification of legislators from appointive office as had existed under the 1870 Constitution. See 6 PROCEEDINGS, Committee on the LegislativeArticle Proposal
#1, supra note 6, at 1346.
21. 6

PROCEEDINGS,

Committee on the Legislative Article Proposal# 1,

supra note 6, at 1346.
22. See Warwick v. State ex rel. Chance, 548 P.2d 384, 389 n.17 (Alaska
1976); see also note 26 infra.
23. G. BRADEN & R. COHN, supra note 18, at 177-78.
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the courts both certainty and flexibility in applying its man24
date.
On its face, the ineligibility clause hardly seems murky.
The provision states that: "[n] o member of the General Assembly, during the term for which he was elected or appointed, shall
be appointed to a public office which shall have been created or
the compensation and allowances of which shall have been increased by the General Assembly during that term. '25 Despite
the apparent clarity of this provision, case law illustrates the difficulty which many courts have experienced in applying its
terms.26 This difficulty stems, in part, from the purported need
to balance the objectives of the ineligibility clause against three
24. See 4 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 6, at 2670, 2827.
25. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 2(e), $ 2.
26. The difficulty which the courts have had in construing the qualified
restriction can be seen by examining the exhaustive list of cases compiled
in Warwick v. State ex rel. Chance, 548 P.2d 384, 389 n.17 (Alaska 1976), reprinted in Vreeland v. Byrne, 72 N.J. 292, 313 n.4, 370 A.2d 825, 836 n.4 (1977)
(Hughes, C.J., dissenting). These cases can be grouped into five categories.
Group I consists of cases which have addressed the issue of whether
the position to which the legislator was appointed is a public office within
the meaning of the clause. Compare cases upholding eligibility: In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 132 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1961) (director of the Board
of Conservation); Golding v. Armstrong, 231 Miss. 889, 97 So. 2d 379 (1957)
(executive director of State Sovereignty Commission) with cases invalidating the appointment or election under the clause: In re Advisory Opinion to
the Governor, 225 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1969) (Secretary of Administration); Romney v. Barlow, 24 Utah 2d 226, 469 P.2d 497 (1970) (position on Legislative
Council).
Group H consists of cases which have attempted to define what constitutes an increase in the emoluments or compensation of an office. Compare
those cases finding no such increase: State ex rel. Lyons v. Guy, 107 N.W.2d
211 (N.D. 1961) (expenses, purchase of an automobile and increase in social
security coverage); Shields v. Toronto, 16 Utah 2d 61, 395 P.2d 829 (1964)
(seven percent across-the-board increase is a cost-of-living adjustment)
with cases finding that the emoluments of the office were increased: State
ex rel. Anaya v. McBride, 88 N.M. 244, 539 P.2d 1006 (1975) (cost-of-living
adjustment was not de minimus and therefore constituted increase in the
emoluments); Hall v. Baum, 452 S.W.2d 699 (Tex. 1970), appeal dismissed,
397 U.S. 93 (1970) (substantial raise in compensation for office of Governor).
Group HI includes cases concerning the legislator's term of office. The
issue varies from whether the resignation has any effect on the appointment to whether the ineligibility extends to an office the term of which will
not begin until after expiration of his elected term. See Meredith v. Kaufmann, 293 Ky. 395, 169 S.W.2d 37 (1943) (appointee to office became a member of the legislature after passage of the salary increase); Spears v. Davis,
298 S.W.2d 921 (Tex. 1966) (ineligibilty clause does not prevent legislator
from seeking office the term of which will not begin until after expiration of
legislative term).
Group IV consists of cases which have been presented with the question of whether subsequent events can validate an otherwise unconstitutional appointment. See State ex rel. Hawthorne v. Wiseheart, 158 Fla. 267,
28 So. 2d 589 (1946) (appointee retained his office because challenge was not
brought within the time in which the constitutional provision barred his appointment). But see Warwick v. State ex rel. Chance, 548 P.2d 384 (Alaska
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competing considerations. These considerations include: the
preference of our political system for participation in and eligiblity to public office;27 the appropriateness of using legislative
service to nurture leadership qualities; 28 and the desirability of
having an experienced person continue in public service.29 As a
result of these policy arguments, many courts prefer a narrow
30
construction of the ineligibility clause in favor of eligibility.
The true source of difficulty in applying the ineligibility
clause is the marked tendency of the courts to look solely at the
language of the provision without resort to the debates which
spawned those words. Viewed in this narrow light, the ineligibility clause appears merely to seek removal of any expectation
of personal gain from a legislator's consideration in voting to
proliferate government or increase its cost.31 Thus, the provi1976) (additional increase in the salary of an office after appointment of a
legislator thereto does not render the issue moot).
Group V consists of cases which do not fit neatly in the other four categories. See Opinion of the Justices, 279 Ala. 38, 181 So. 2d 105 (1965) (appointment valid because office was elective and appointment thereto fit
within constitutional exception of offices which are filled by vote of the people.); Mayor v. Green, 144 Md. 85, 124 A. 403 (1923) (statute changing city
clerk from elective to appointive office did not create an office); Vreeland v.
Byrne, 72 N.J. 292, 370 A.2d 825 (1977) (appointment invalid despite statutory provision preventing legislator from receiving increase in salary during
the balance of his intended term).
27. Warwick v. State ex rel. Chance, 548 P.2d at 388-89; accord, Shields V.
Toronto, 16 Utah 2d 61, 395 P.2d 829 (1964); State ex rel. O'Connell v. Dubuque, 68 Wash. 2d 553, 413 P.2d 972 (1966).
28. E.g., Shields v. Toronto, 16 Utah 2d 61, 395 P.2d 829 (1964).
29. Id.; accord, State ex rel. Lyons v. Guy, 107 N.W.2d 211 (N.D. 1961);
State ex rel. Grigsby v. Ostroot, 75 S.D. 319, 64 N.W.2d 62 (1954). But see
Pollitt, Senator/Attorney General Saxbe and the Ineligibility Clause of the
Constitutiow An Encroachment Upon the Separation of Powers, 53 N.C.L.

REV. 111 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Pollit].
30. See In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 132 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1961);
accord, Redmond v. Carter, 247 N.W. 2d 268 (Iowa 1976).
31. As a result, the courts have uniformly viewed the provision from the
standpoint of its effect of securing disinterestedness in a legislator's vote.
See Warwick v. State ex rel. Chance, 548 P.2d at 388 n.5 (Alaska 1976). In
doing so, they have cited to the comments of Mr. Justice Story:
The reasons for excluding persons from office who have been concerned in creating them, or increasing their emoluments, are to take
away, as far as possible, any improper bias in the vote of the representative, and to secure ...

some solemn pledge of his disinterestedness.

2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONsTrrUION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 864 (1833). There was more behind the thinking of the drafters, however,
when they incorporated this clause into the Federal Constitution. In Reservists Comm. to Stop the War v. Laird, 323 F. Supp. 833 (D.D.C. 1971), rev'd

on othergrounds, 418 U.S. 208 (1974), the Court traced the origin of the ineli-

gibility and incompatibility clauses of the Federal Constitution. There, the
Court noted that the Framers were sincerely concerned with the use of
political appointments to subvert the independence of legislative action.
Id. at 835. Thus, the reason for destroying any expectation of personal aggrandizement from the legislator's consideration was to prevent the execu-
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sion seemingly expresses a fear that legislators would otherwise
seek to profit from their votes, 32 and is apparently designed only
to protect against such selfish motivation. 33 This superficial
analysis, however, ignores the deeper concerns which gave birth
to the restriction.
This article will suggest an alternative analytical approach
toward construction of the "qualified restriction" form of the ineligiblity clause--one which finds its interpretations in the history of the clause. The first part of the article examines the
evolution of the ineligibility clause in state constitutions, lending insight into its original purposes and intended objectives. In
part two, problems with present-day application of the clause
will be analyzed and a resolution through the lessons of history
will be offered.
HISTORIcAL ANALYSIS OF THE INELIGIBILITY CLAUSE

In Gompers v. United States,34 Mr. Justice Holmes explained why an historical analysis of a constitutional provision
is essential to its present-day interpretation:
[T] he provisions of the Constitution are not mathematical formulas having their essence in their form; they are organic living institutions transplanted from English soil. Their significance... is to
be gathered not simply by taking the words and a dictionary
but by
35
considering their origin and the line of their growth.

Although his words referred directly to the United States Constitution conceived in response to the misgivings witnessed in
England, their relevance to state constitutions is evident. The
thirteen original colonies, in drafting their respective constitutions, were likewise influenced by the abuses of the colonial governors. 36 As additional states joined the Union, their
constitutional conventions borrowed generously from these "extive from using political appointments as an inducement to secure favorable
legislative votes. Pollitt, supra note 29, at 113-14.
32. See, e.g., Warwick v. State ex rel. Chance, 548 P.2d 384, 388 (Alaska
1976) ("This type of constitutional provision is designed not only to stop
overt trafficking in offices, but also to prevent less obvious influences on a
legislator's actions . . ").

33. 2 J.

STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONsTrrUION OF THE UNITED

STATES § 867 (1833).

34. 233 U.S. 604 (1914).
35. Id. at 610.
36. See Tomasek, A Responsive and Responsible Twentieth Century Legislature, 48 N.D.L. REV. 258, 261 (1971) ("[The constitutions of the thirteen
original colonies] were for the most part modifications of their colonial
charters. The modifications were in the direction of curbing the powers of
the... governor. The Royal Governors... as symbols of the hated King
George IMl were on the minds of the men who drafted [them].").
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isting models. '37 Thus, state constitutions, like their federal
counterpart, have evolved from the same origin.
Origin of the Ineligibility Clcause

Limitations on eligibility to appointive office originated in
38
England in response to political corruption in that country.
The English monarchy had substantially increased its power by
"purchasing" favorable parliamentary votes in exchange for
prized political appointments. In an effort to reform the appointive process in England, limitations on eligibility to appointive
offices were imposed. 39 Our Founding Fathers were also concerned with the influence which the English monarchy exerted
over Parliament through its power to fill vacancies.4° Therefore,
they continued this reform movement in framing the fundamental law of the Union and included the country's first ineligibility
clause as part of article I, section 6 of the United States Consti41
tution.
During the United States Constitutional Convention of 1787,
the drafters of the Virginia Plan recommended that legislators
be completely excluded from appointive office during their
elected term.42 This proposal was not popular, however, be37. Id. at 262-63. The first Illinois Constitution of 1818 borrowed wholesale from the Federal Constitution and those of the thirteen original states.
See J. CORNELUUS, supra note 5, at 32.
38. See Note, Dual Office Holding and Conflicts in Appointive Powers,
31 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 254, 256 (1957). The beginnings of an ineligibility
clause were the dual office holding provisions. In England, these provisions
are traced back to the Act of Settlement, 12 & 13 Will., ch. 2 (1700), which
precluded officers of the King from serving in the House of Commons.
39. The attempt to reform the abuses in appointive power started at the
turn of the century in England. See Note, Dual Office Holdingand Conflicts
in Appointive Powers,supra note 38, at 256. In the Constitutional Convention of 1787, the Framers were merely continuing this reform ethic in
America. The movement to reform the appointive process did not end
there, however, as most state constitutions written during this time period
engaged in similar efforts. See Omdahl, supra note 4, at 199.
40. Professor Pollitt, quoting in part from 2 G. CuRTis, HISTORY OF THE
ORIGIN, FoRMATION, AND ADOPTION OF THE CONSTrruTION OF THE UNITED

STATES 24243 (1858), observed:
The generation of men who framed and established our Constitution was well aware that "the votes of members of Parliament had been
bought, with money or office by nearly every minister who had been at
the head of affairs"; and that this practice of "parliamentary corruption
was freely and sometimes shamefully applied throughout the American
war."
Pollitt, supra note 29, at 111 (emphasis in original).
41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2; see text accompanying note 47 infra.
42. The Virginia Plan was more or less the blueprint from which the
Constitution was eventually written. The fourth resolution of the Virginia
Plan proposed:
4. Res'd. that the members of the first branch of the National Legisla-
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43
cause it disqualified capable people from executive offices.
Those who opposed disqualification feared that it would result
in a figurehead unable to augment his branch with expertise
learned in the legislature." After much heated debate, James
Madison suggested that a qualified restriction on civil appointments be adopted as a compromise. 45 Madison noted that the
most frequent abuses under the British system occurred in two
situations: when appointive offices were either needlessly created or uselessly enhanced for the sole purpose of appointing
legislators thereto and quieting parliamentary opposition.4 A
qualified restriction would restrain these abuses, while preserving a legislator's eligibility to office in many instances. As eventually adopted, the ineligibility clause provided that "[no
Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he
was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority
of the United States, which shall have been created, or the

ture... be ineligible to any office established by a particular State, or
under the authority of the United States, except those peculiarly belonging to the functions of the first branch, during the time service, and
for [a period of time] . ..after its expiration.
1 M. FARRAND, supra note 2, at 17-20. The fifth resolution contained a similar
provision for the second house of Congress. Id. at 21.
The authors of the Virginia Plan believed that a fixed period of disqualification was needed after the term expired to prevent abuses at the end of
the legislator's term. They were not alone in this belief. See 2 J. STORY,
COMMENTARIES

ON THE CONSTrtUTON

OF THE UNITED STATES,

§§ 864-68

(1833).
43. Pollitt, supra note 29, at 114-16. A motion was made to strike the
fourth and fifth resolutions as "unnecessary and injurious" immediately
upon their introduction. Id. at 115. Alexander Hamilton, who supported
this motion, was particularly concerned with the detrimental effects that
these resolutions would have on the executive. Id. The motion, however,
was voted upon and narrowly defeated.
44. Pollitt, supra note 29, at 115. Charles Pinkney of South Carolina pictured the Senate, in particular, as the groomer of potential leaders. Id. He,
therefore, opposed any clause which placed a restriction on the President's
ability to draw on these men when their services were most desired. Id. at
118.
45. Id. at 116. When it was first proposed, the Madison compromise was
soundly defeated. In response to Madison's proposal, Elbridge Gerry of
Massachusetts remarked:
[It] appears to me, that we have constantly endeavored to keep distant
the three branches of government; but if we agree to this motion, it
must be destroyed by admitting the legislators to share in the executive, or to be too much influenced by the executive in looking up to him
for offices.
1 M. FARRAND, supra note 2, at 393.
46. See Pollitt, supra note 29, at 116. Madison's compromise was eventually adopted in a back-handed way. After a series of proposals were rejected, a suggestion was made to limit eligibility only to offices created by
the legislature. This suggestion was subsequently amended to include offices, the salary of which had been increased. The final vote was far from a
landslide: five states in favor, four opposed and one divided.
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Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during such
time. .... -47
The debates of the 1787 Convention elucidate those concerns which prompted the adoption of the ineligibility clause
and should be considered in determining its application. First,
the primary concern of the clause is the elimination of undue
executive influence over legislative votes. 48 Second, the provision is indifferent to the actual motivation of either the legislator
or the executive; the restriction operates merely because of the
possibility that such influence could be used for improper motives. 49 Third, the ineligibility clause embodies three major contra-policy considerations: the preference for eligibility for office;
the nurturing of leadership qualities through legislative service;
and the continuation of experienced persons in office. 50 Thus,
the provision is a compromise between the evils of abuses in
filling public offices and the harms of excluding capable legislators from appointment to executive posts.
This compromise is the most important aspect of the clause
in resolving questions arising under its provisions. When a
court narrowly construes the clause in favor of eligibility, it is
disturbing the balance between preventing abuses in the appointive process and allowing experienced legislators to continue in public service. The qualified restriction on civil
appointments is narrowly written in favor of eligibility. To apply a narrow construction, in addition to its inherent bias toward
eligibility, unduly limits the scope of the ineligibility clause. 51
47. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
48. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208,
229 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also Vreeland v. Byrne, 72 N.J. 292,

311, 370 A.2d 825, 836 (1977) (Hughes, C.J., dissenting).
49. Alexander Hamilton was convinced that despite the possible evils
for which the appointive power could be used, optimism should be shown
because of the potential good ends toward which legislators could be motivated. See note 140 infra. Hamilton's positive view was not accepted, however, in fear that likelihood of corrupt abuse far outweighed the possible
benefits. Pollitt, supra note 29, at 114. Thus, in examining the validity of an
appointment under the ineligibility clause, the actual motives of the executive and the legislator are irrelevant. See, e.g., Warwick v. State ex rel.
Chance, 548 P.2d 384, 390 (Alaska 1976).

50. See notes 27-29 and accompanying text supra. The arguments
raised by those who, opposed the fourth and fifth resolutions of the Virginia
Plan are these contra-policy considerations. Alexander Hamilton expressed concern over disqualifying anyone from office, but especially the
experienced legislator who could add to the effectiveness of the executive.
Pollitt, supra note 29, at 115-121. In addition, Charles Pinkney recognized
the function of the legislature, particularly the Senate, in nurturing potential leaders. Id. at 118.
51. See Pollitt, supra note 29, at 113.
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Development of the Clause in State Constitutions
After the 1787 Convention, many state constitutions adopted
the qualified restriction form of the ineligibility clause as part of
their legislative articles. 52 Today, more than half of the states
have retained a provision patterned after the federal ineligibility
clause. 53 The debates in many state constitutional conventions
have paralleled the arguments raised by the Founding Fathers.54 New Jersey's Constitutional Convention in 1844 was a
prime example. During the Convention, a proposal similar to
the one suggested by the Virginia Plan was rejected by a two-toone margin. 55 In the debate over this provision, careful consideration was given to the dangers of undue executive influence
and the need to prevent corruption, as well as to the desirability
56
of safeguarding a legislator's eligibility to appointive office.
Madison's compromise proposal was ultimately adopted in New
Jersey with one modification; New Jersey's ineligibility clause
57
additionally applied to elective offices.
Other states, such as Illinois, never gave express recognition to these concerns. The First Illinois Constitutional Convention in 1818 copied the clause verbatim from the United States
Constitution.5 8 In doing so, the delegates followed the prevailing habit of incorporating provisions from existing constitutions
without debating the policies behind those provisions.5 9 The result of this procedure was often a discordant mix of miscellaneous provisions. Thus, while the Illinois Constitution of 1818
contained an ineligibility clause, Illinois also vested the power
60
to fill vacancies in the state legislature.
52. E.g., CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 5 (1844). The ineligibility clause was also
included in the Organic Acts that established the territorial governments.
See, e.g., Alaska Organic Act, Act of Aug. 24, 1912, § 11, 37 Stat. 512; Kansas
Organic Act, Act of May 30, 1854, § 26, 37 Stat. 286.
53. See note 16 supra.
54. See, e.g., 3 ALASKA CONSTrurIONAL CONVENTION PROCEEDINGS 144-49
(1956); PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW JERSEY STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1844, at 510-19 (1942).
55. See PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW JERSEY STATE CONSTrruTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1844, at 518 (1942).
56. Id.
57. N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 5, 2 (1844).
58. See generally J. CoRNELIUS, supra note 5, at 3-24.
59. The 1818 Constitution was written in one week and debated for only
two. There were two dominant reasons for this haste. The first was the
desire to become a state before Missouri did. The other was "that ... Illinois constitution makers were typical of the writers of frontier constitutions
in their impatience with the time and effort [needed] to formulate a...
coherent statement of the principles of state government ....
[They] borrowed provisions wholesale from other constitutions and made innovations
only when [necessary]." J. CORNELIUS, supra note 5, at 10-11.
60. The governor was actually given an extensive appointive power. See
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The Second Illinois Constitutional Convention in 1848 con61
fronted public dissatisfaction with the appointive process.
This dissatisfaction prompted three major constitutional revisions: (1) the power to fill vacancies was vested exclusively in
the governor, (2) many previously appointive posts were
changed to elective offices, and (3) the absolute disqualification
form of the ineligibility clause was adopted.6 2 The appointive
power remained structured in this manner until 1970 when the
Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention again reversed the cycle.
The 1970 Convention acknowledged the need for a strong executive. As a result, the governor retained his appointive
power, 63 two elective posts were re-established as appointive offices, 64 and in drafting the ineligibility clause, the Committee on

the Legislative Article returned once again to a qualified restriction on civil appointments. 65 This reform gave the executive the
benefits of drawing on legislative expertise in ifiling offices while
protecting the appointive process from the major areas of
abuse. 66 Thus, over the course of one-hundred and fifty years,
Illinois has implicitly acknowledged the arguments raised by
the Founding Fathers in adopting the qualified restriction on
67
civil appointments.
THE INELIGIBILITY CLAUSE TODAY

Over its approximately two-hundred year history, the ineligibility clause has caused a "surfeit of litigation. 6 8 While a variart. III, § 22 (1818). The schedule adopted after this article, however, gave the legislature a concurrent appointing power over state officers.
ILL. CONST.

J. CORNELIUS, supra note 5, at 13. In the end, the legislature made most of
the appointments.
61. S. GOVE & T. Krrsos, supra note 3, at 3.
62. J. CORNELIUS, supra note 5, at 34-35; see also BRADEN & COHN, supra
note 18, at 176-78.
63. ILL. CONST. art. V, § 9.
64. See E. GERTZ & J. PISCIOTrE, supra note 5, at 216-21; see also notes 10
& 15 supra.
65. Compare ILL.CONST. art. IV, § 2(e), 2 with ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 15
(1870).
66. See notes 10 & 15 supra.
67. 6 PROCEEDINGS, Committee on the Legislative Article Proposal #1,
supra note 6, at 1346.
68. See note 26 supra. Litigation over article 1, section 6 of the Federal
Constitution has been severely limited because of the Supreme Court's
holding in Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937), and Schlesinger v. Reservists
Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974). In Levitt, the appointment of
Hugo Black to the Supreme Court was challenged on the basis of the ineligibilty clause. Justice Black had been a member of the Senate in March,
1937 when Congress passed the Judges Retirement Act, Act of March 1,
1937, ch. 21, §§ 1-2, 54 Stat. 24 (codified as amended, 28 U.S. C. § 371 (1970)),
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ety of questions have been raised in these cases, a central
problem has been common to nearly all of them. This basic dispute has involved whether a literal application or historical analysis approach should be adopted in construing the provision.
The remainder of this article addresses three major areas of difficulty in construing the ineligibility clause. These are: (1) defining what is a public office, (2) determining whether a cost-ofliving adjustment is an increase in salary within the meaning of
the clause, and (3) determining the effect of a legislator's resignation upon his eligibility for public office.
Defining a Public Office
Perhaps the most perplexing problem raised by cases involving the ineligibility clause is determining whether a legislator has received appointment to a public office. This problem
arises from the concerted effort of the courts to distinguish a
public office from mere public employment.69 The fine line
which distinguishes these two categories of government service
is often difficult to discern. Virtually all cases construing the
words "public office" within the purview of the clause apply the
traditional tests developed in other areas of the law for determining a public office without regard to whether these tests are
consistent with the purpose of the ineligibilty clause. 70 This litwhich allowed a Justice of the Supreme Court to retire, rather than resign
at age 70, with a pension equal to their then-existing salary. Retirement
enabled a Justice to avoid paying income tax. See Note, Legality of Justice
Black's Appointment to the Supreme Court, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 1212 (1937).

The Supreme Court dismissed Levitt's action on the basis of insufficient
standing. 302 U.S. at 634. Ex parte Levitt was reaffirmed in Schlesinger, 418
U.S. at 216-23.
There have been, however, four Attorneys' General Opinions issued
concerning the validity of an appointment under the ineligibility clause.
See 42 Op. Aar'y GEN. No 36 (Jan. 3, 1969) (ban does not apply to an increase in compensation subsequent to the appointment, although during
the legislator's elected term); 33 Op. ATr'y GEN. 88 (1922) clause inapplicable where increase is enacted during first term and appointment is made
during subsequent term); 21 Op. ATr'Y GEN. 211 (1895) (ban applies upon
nomination and confirmation of appointment, not upon the commission of
office); 17 Op. Arr'Y GEN. 365 (1882) (legislator's resignation before his appointment to an office which was created during his elected term, but after
his resignation, does not render his appointment valid).
69. See generally Glasser, A New Jersey MunicipalLaw Mystery: What
Is A "Public Office?", 6 RUTGERS L. REV. 503 (1952) [hereinafter cited as
Glasser]; Waldby, The Public Officer-Public Employee Distinctionin Flor-

ida, 9 U. Fla. L. Rev. 47 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Waldby].
70. E.g., Kederich v. Heintzleman, 132 F. Supp. 582 (D.C. Alaska 1955); In
re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 225 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1969); Golding v.
Armstrong, 231 Miss. 889, 97 So. 2d 379 (1957); Romney v. Barlow, 24 Utah 2d
226, 469 P.2d 479 (1970). The traditional test for determining whether the
post involved constitutes a public office revolves around the presence of six
criteria: (1) compensation; (2) creation by constitution or statute; (3) du-
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eral application results in a technical, formalistic distinction
without any real utility in applying the ineligibility clause.
Prior cases illustrate this point. For example, in Romney v.
Barlow,71 a statute created a "legislative council" consisting of
sixteen legislators. 72 The legislators were appointed by the
leadership of their respective houses and parties. 7 3 The council's duties involved predominantly legislative functions, 74 and
its powers were similar to those granted to other legislative committees. 75 The Utah Supreme Court, applying the traditional
tests, found that these legislators were appointed to a "public
office" within the meaning and in violation of the ineligibility
clause. 76 In reaching this conclusion, the court looked solely to
the presence of six criteria delineating a public office. These
were that the post was: (1) compensated; (2) created by statute;
(3) permanent and continuous in nature; (4) given duties defined by law; (5) delegated some portion of the sovereign power;
77
and (6) independent of supervision or control.
More detailed analysis, however, reveals that membership
on a legislative council, such as the one involved in Romney, is
not the type of appointment which the clause is intended to prohibit. Indeed, the striking similarity between the council and a
typical legislative committee demonstrates that membership on
ties defined by law; (4) exercise of some delegated portion of the sovereign
power; (5) permanence; and (6) independence from supervision or control.
See generally Glasser, supra note 69, at 505; Walby, supra note 69, at 52-53.
71. 24 Utah 2d 226, 469 P.2d 497 (1970).
72. The action actually arose because of an amendment to the statute
providing for remuneration to the council members of a twenty-five dollar
per day salary plus expenses. 24 Utah 2d at 227, 469 P.2d at 497-98 (1970).
73. The act provided, in part, that:
There is created a legislative council of sixteen members of the legislature. Four members shall be appointed from each major political party
by each house upon recommendation of each party caucus. The president of the senate ...and the speaker of the house of representatives
shall each be one of the four appointees from the political party with
which he is affiliated.
74. The council's duties included: (1) assisting the legislature by collecting information on the general needs of the state; (2) examining the
benefits and disadvantages of existing legislation; (3) investigating into
state expenditures; and (4) acting as "reference attorney" to the legislative
houses. Id. at 230, 469 P.2d at 498-99.
75. The council's powers involved administering oaths, issuing subpoenas and deposing witnesses. While the council performed its work according to its own guidelines, it was still responsible to the legislature as a
whole. Id. at 229, 469 P.2d at 498.
76. Id. at 230, 469 P.2d at 499. "We think and hold that membership on
the Legislative Council constitutes the holding of a civil office; and since the
salary is $25 per day, it is certainly a civil office of profit." See UTAH CONST.

art. IV, § 7 ("No member
profit. ..

..

shall be appointed ...to any civil office of

").

77. 24 Utah 2d at 229-30, 469 P.2d at 498-99 (1970).
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the council does not constitute a public office within the meaning and purpose of the clause. Although the council position is
permanent in nature, each legislator's occupancy of that position is co-terminous with his tenure in office. In addition, the
powers and responsibilities of the council, including the power
to subpoena, swear in and depose witnesses, are neither greater
nor different than those enjoyed by other legislative committees.
Moreover, the council assists in the formulation of better legislation by performing in depth analysis of the state's needs, the effects of existing statutes and the dispersal of state funds. Thus,
the council, utilizing the benefits of specialization and division
of labor, acts in the same manner as all legislative committees.
It should be noted that there were two features which distinguished the council from other legislative committees. One
feature was the inclusion, in a single committee, of members
from both houses of the legislature representing both political
parties. 78 There was nothing in the history of the ineligibility
clause, however, which indicated that its language was intended
to disqualify legislators from a bi-partisan, bi-cameral legislative
council. In fact, historical analysis of the ineligibility clause
would clearly have demonstrated the contrary. 79 The other distinguishing feature of the council in Romney concerned the
renumeration to its members of a per diem salary. Although
this argument constituted a valid ground for objection, the court
exceeded the bounds of judicial restraint and deference to legislative action by not simply striking the compensation provision
and leaving the remainder of the statute intact.8 0
Another instance where the court literally applied the traditional tests for determining public offices and reached a result
equally inconsistent with the purpose of the ineligibility clause
occurred in Golding v. Armstrong.81 In Golding, the Mississippi
legislature created the Sovereignty Commission, a supervisory
committee over governmental affairs, chaired by the state executive. 82 The Commission was authorized to "employ all neces78. See note 69 supra.
79. In this regard, the Legislative Council bears a striking similarity to
the Conference Committee of the Federal Congress. Surely one would not
argue that a Congressman may not be constitutionally appointed to the
Conference Committee because of the federal ineligibility clause.
80. Cf. Vreeland v. Byrne, 72 NJ. 292, 311, 370 A.2d 825, 836 (1977)
(Hughes, CJ., dissenting) (where an alternative to completely invalidating
a statute exists, the courts, out of deference to the legislature and in recognition of their proper role, should not "wantonly assail" an act of the legislature).
81. 231 Miss. 889, 97 So. 2d 379 (1957).
82. 3 Miss. CODE ANN. ch. 1, §§ 1-35.
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sary personnel." 8 3 Pursuant to this authorization, the
Commission established an Executive Director post which was
invested with the responsibility of managing the Commission's
affairs. This post directed and supervised the entire work of the
Commission. The Mississippi Supreme Court found that the
post was not a public office within the meaning of the ineligibility clause.84 The court based its decision primarily on the fact
that the Executive Director worked "at the pleasure and under
the direction of the State Sovereignty Commission." 85
Yet, unlike the council in Romney, the post in Golding exercised executive rather than legislative authority. Although the
appointment was made by the Commission as a whole, and not
the governor acting individually, the governor was nonetheless
given the wherewithal to influence legislative action. Furthermore, the appointee, while still a member of the legislature, was
no more immune from the inducements of office than he would
have been if appointed Commissioner. 86 Despite the difference
in prestige and pay between Commissioner and Executive Director, the power and position of the latter post presented the
same potential influences which the ineligibility clause was
designed to protect against. Thus, Golding exhibited the common ineligibility clause situation, and demonstrated the incoma public office
patibility of the traditional tests for determining
87
and the purposes of the ineligibility clause.
An idealistic approach to resolving this incompatibility
might be to simply abolish the distinction between public office
and public employment on public policy grounds in cases involving the ineligibility clause. 88 However, the categorization is
83. Id.
84. 231 Miss. at 897, 97 So. 2d at 383.
85. Id.
86. When the person making the appointment is a member of the executive branch, the legislator is susceptible to the very evils which the clause
was designed to protect against. The fact that an executive officer other
than the governor makes the appointment is irrelevant. See Pollitt, supra
note 29, at 115 n.18 (many of the abuses of appointments in England were
attributed not to the King himself, but to his ministers).
87. As one critic of the public office/employment distinction stated in a
related context:
it seems unrealistic to hold that a rule against holding incompatible
posts is inapplicable merely because the post of counsel is a "position"
and the rule only applies to "offices." If the two jobs are "incompatible"
in any realistic sense of the word, the fact that one is called a "position"
rather than an "office" has little perceptible relevancy.
Glasser, supra note 69, at 504.
88. The argument is simply that any appointment of a legislator made
by the governor or one of his officers presents sufficient potential for abuse
to warrant abolition of these distinctions. This is the approach in California. See CAJ- CONST. art. IV, § 19.
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firmly imbedded in legal thinking,8 9 and important legal conse-

quences attach to each classification. 9° The appropriate solution
is to develop a standard which defines public office consistent
with the purposes of the clause.
As previously indicated, the purpose of the ineligibility
clause is to prevent the executive from using the appointive
power to influence legislative action. The clause prohibits appointments to certain offices under the belief that these appointments present the most frequent instances of abuse, and that a
provision which completely disqualifies all legislators from appointment is excessively burdensome.
The Illinois Supreme Court proferred a standard which encompassed these concerns in Gillespiev. Barrett.91 In Gillespie,
the court was called upon to interpret the words "civil appointment" as used in the ineligibility clause of the 1870 Illinois Constitution.92 The action challenged the validity of a statute
creating three special "exhibition " commissions staffed by
members of the legislature. 9 3 The court found the words "civil
appointment" synonymous with "public office" and concluded
that the act did not violate the ineligibility clause since the positions were not "civil appointments." 94 The court stated that "to
come within the [clause's] proscription, an appointment must
[have been] of a permanent nature and must [have lent] itself to
personalaggrandizementwith the opportunityfor personalgain
"95

Although the court's interpretation involved the "absolute
disqualification" form of the clause, its rationale is applicable to
the "qualified" ineligibility clause. 96 The court's definition recognizes that offices of a permanent nature with the potential for
personal aggrandizement are the type which an executive might

try to manipulate through his appointing powers. Moreover,
89.
90.
91.
92.

Glasser, .supra note 69, at 504-05.
Id. at 503.
368 Ill. 612, 15 N.E.2d 513 (1870).
ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 15. This provision provided in pertinent part

that "[n]o person elected to the General Assembly shall receive any civil
appointment within this State from the Governor ... during the term for
which he shall have been elected. ..

."

93. In Gillespie, the taxpayer filed suit to enjoin the State Treasurer
from drawing against the appropriations made by three legislative acts.
These acts created the Gettysburg Memorial Commission, the Golden Gate
Exhibition Commission, and the New York World's Fair Commission. 368
Ill. at 614, 15 N.E.2d at 514.
94. Id. at 617, 15 N.E.2d at 516.
95. Id. (emphasis added).
96. Both clauses have the same general purpose though the scope of
their proscription is different. See notes 42-51 and accompanying text
supra.
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limiting offices to those positions with the potential for personal
gain conforms with the underlying assumption of the qualified
ineligibility clause that such positions present the most frequent instances of abuse.
Another standard for defining public office, equally consistent with the purposes of the ineligibility clause, was adopted by
the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention in 1970. During
their debates, the delegates expressed a great deal of concern
97
over which positions fell within the proscription of the clause.
The Committee on the Legislative Article proposed a single
standard: "'Does the public office in question primarily possess
substantive policy-making functions?' If a public office is primarily administrative in character, it would not come within the
scope of the definition." 98
This standard, like the one espoused in Gillespie,rejects the
traditional indica of a public office, 99 and instead concentrates

more on the particular objective of the constitutional provision. l0 0 In addition, both standards allow the courts greater flexibility in judging the validity of an appointment. This eliminates
the need for strained reasoning by the courts in effectuating the
provision's purpose. Both offer an attractive alternative to literal application of the traditional tests for public office and the
discordant outcome that can result in cases involving the ineligibility clause.
Are Cost-of-Living Adjustments an Increase in Salary?
Several cases challenging the validity of a legislator's appointment under the ineligibility clause have required the
courts to define what constituted an increase in the compensation' 0 1 or emoluments 10 2 of an office. The first cases presenting
97. See 4 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 6, at 2827.
98. 6 PROCEEDINGS, Committee on Legislative Article Proposal#1, supra
note 6, at 1346.
99. See note 70 supra.

100. The standard proposed by the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention originated in People v. Capuzi, 20 Ill. 2d 486, 170 N.E.2d 625 (1960). In
Capuzi, the Illinois Supreme Court was called upon to interpret the words
"other lucrative offices" as used in the dual office holding provision of the
1870 Constitution. In adopting the distinction between administerial and
policy-making functions, the Court applied the maxim ejusdem generis,
looking at the enumerated list of offices to delineate the catch-all phrase.
See ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (1870).
101. See State ex.rel. Anaya v. McBride, 89 N.M. 244, 539 P.2d 1006 (1975)
(cost-of-living adjustment was not de minimus and therefore constituted an
increase in the emoluments of office); State ex rel. Lyons v. Guy, 107 N.W.2d
211 (N.D. 1961) (expenses, purchase of an automobile, and increase in social
security coverage); Hall v. Baum, 452 S.W.2d 699 (Tex. 1970), appeal dismissed, 397 U.S. 93 (1970) (substantial raise in compensation of the office of
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this issue involved offices which received newly created pensions or retirement benefits prior to the legislator's appointment.'0 3 Courts have uniformly found that these benefits are
not an increase in the compensation of the office. 1° 4 The analytical approach adopted by these courts have not, however, shown
a similar uniformity. Some courts applied an historical analysis
merely applied
approach in defining public office, while 10others
5
the definition found in legal dictionaries.
This issue has again been raised to the forefront by the inflationary spiral of recent years. Inflation has forced legislatures
to increase the salaries paid to public officials on an across-theboard basis. In some states, these "cost-of-living" adjustments' 0 6 have become virtually an annual event. 10 7 The frequency with which these adjustments have become necessary
Governor); Shields v. Toronto, 16 Utah 2d 61, 395 P.2d 829 (1964) (seven percent across-the-board increase in salaries is a cost-of-living adjustment);
State ex rel. Todd v. Reeves, 196 Wash. 145, 82 P.2d 173 (1938) (retirement
benefits).
102. Although the literal meaning of the word "emoluments" encompasses more than solely the compensation of an office, see BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 616 (rev. 4th ed. 1968), courts generally construe these words as
synonymous. Shields v. Toronto, 16 Utah 2d 61, 65, 395 P.2d 829, 834 (1964).
This interpretation seems to conform with the intention of the drafters. See
State ex rel. Lyons v. Guy, 107 N.W.2d 211, 218 (N.D. 1961) (recognizing that
the drafters used this word in its ordinary sense, which at the time, was as a
synonym for compensation); see also 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 2, at 390-99.
103. See Bulgo v. Enomoto, 50 Hawaii 61,430 P.2d 327 (1967) (social security and workmen compensation benefits are not an increase in the emoluments of office); State ex rel. Lyons v. Guy, 107 N.W.2d 211 (N.D. 1961)
(increase in social security coverage did not raise compensation of office
within the purview of the clause); State ex rel. Todd v. Reeves, 196 Wash.
145, 82 P.2d 173 (1938) (judge's retirement benefits are not increase in the
emoluments of office).
104. The U.S. Supreme Court was faced with, but never reached, this issue in Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937). See note 85 supra.
105. Compare State ex rel. Lyons v. Guy, 107 N.W.2d 211 (N.D. 1961) (applying a somewhat "faulty" historical analysis approach) with State ex rel.
Todd v. Reeves, 196 Wash. 145, 82 P.2d 173 (1938) (applying the definition of
the word "emolument" found in BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 102,
without looking to its constitutional history).
106. Cost-of-living adjustments are increases in salary, wages, etc.
designed to return an officer/employee to the compensation needed to
cover those goods and services purchased at accepted standards of consumption. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 515 (16th
ed. 1971).
107. In New Jersey, for instance, the legislature passed eight general salary increases over the ten year period from 1966-1976 which raised the salaries of state offices by less than 8%. Vreeland v. Byrne, 72 N.J. at 317, 370
A.2d at 845 n.10 (1977). In addition, an appropriation bill (S-1309 passed
June 26, 1980) recently increased the salary of state offices by another 7%:
3.5% effective July 1, 1980, and 3.5% effective April 1, 1981. Plaintiff's Brief in
Support of Order to Show Cause, Student Pub. Interest Research Group v.
Byrne, No. A-4384-79 (N.J. App. Div., filed July 5, 1980).

The John Marshall Law Review

(Vol. 14:819

has raised the issue of whether they are an "increase in salary"
within the meaning of the ineligibility clause.
In State ex rel. Anaya v. McBride, l0 8 the Supreme Court of
New Mexico addressed this issue in dictum.10 9 The court
adopted a literal interpretation of the ineligibiilty clause and
found no reason to differentiate between cost-of-living adjustments and other increases. 110 The court stated that since the
clause made no express exclusion for cost-of-living adjustments,
it was beyond the scope of judicial review to imply such an exemption. 1 ' If the public wished to exclude these small percentage raises from the ineligibility clause, the proper mechanism
1 2
was a constitutional, not judical, amendment.
Silence in constitutional provisions is, however, ambiguous
and may express either the drafters' intention not to overly define an issue or their unintentional failure to foresee future
events. 113 Thus, the McBride court is incorrect in deeming a
construction of "increase in salary" which excludes cost-of-liv108. 88 N.M. 244, 539 P.2d 1006 (1975). In McBride, a legislator was appointed to the office of district judge, the salary of which was increased by
the legislature during the appointee's term. Although the appointment was
made after the legislator's term had expired, his appointment was still challenged under the New Mexico ineligibility clause which forbids appointment for one year after the expiration of the legislator's term. See N.M.
CONST. art. IV, § 28. After finding that it had jurisdiction over the cause, the
New Mexico Supreme Court rejected the respondent's contention that the
clause was not meant to apply to constitutional offices. 88 N.M. at 259, 539
P.2d at 1014. Contra, State ex rel. Grigsby v. Ostroot, 75 S.D. 319, 64 N.W.2d
62 (1954).
109. The issue of whether the raise was a cost-of-living adjustment not
within the purview of the clause was not raised by the respondent but by
the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice McManus, 88 N.M. at 260, 539 P.2d at
1014, which quoted extensively from Shields v. Toronto, 16 Utah 2d 61, 395
P.2d 829 (1964). Shields had raised the issue of whether cost-of-living adjustments increased the compensation of an office, and had decided that
they did not. See notes 115-24 and accompanying text infra.
110. 88 N.M. at 259, 539 P.2d at 1014. "We are bound to apply the Constitution as it plainly reads [and] to leave to the people the decision as to
whether it should be changed." 88 N.M. at 255, 539 P.2d at 1012.
111. 88 N.M. at 259, 539 P.2d at 1014. In responding to the arguments of
the dissenting justice the court stated:
We doubt that when the people adopted art. IV, § 28 in 1911 they were
thinking in terms of cost of living adjustments or that they intended to
except such increases from the operation of that clause. Certainly they
did not say so ... Clearly the emoluments were more after the increase
than they were before--$7,000 more.
Id.; accord, Vreeland v. Byrne, 72 N.J. at 305, 370 A.2d at 833 (Sullivan, J.,
concurring).
112. See Note, Survey of Constitutional Law, Part 1" Special Legislation-Strict Construction of Ineligibility Clause, 31 RUTGERS L. REv. 388

(1978).
113. In order for a constitution not to be obsolete before it is adopted, the
document must "state not rules for the passing hour, but principals for an
expanding future." B. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JuDIcIAL PROCEss 24
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ing adjustments as "judicial amendment." The issue is one of
interpretation. Moreover, the ramifications of holding that costof-living adjustments are "increases in salary" within the meaning of ineligibility clause are far-reaching. If cost-of-living adjustments are enacted in each new term, 114 legislators would, in
effect, be completely ineligible for any other public office during
their term. Thus, the "qualified restriction" becomes an "absolute disqualification" the very occurrence rejected at the constitutional conventions. However, exempting these adjustments
from the terms "increase in salary" emasculates the restriction
against a legislator's appointment to an office, the salary of
which was increased during his term. This result is equally inconsistent with the drafters' intentions. Faced with this dilemma, the court must look beyond the language of the
ineligibility clause in order to reach a decision which effectuates
its purpose.
The Utah Supreme Court did exactly that in Shields v. Toronto.115 In Shields, the candidacy of three legislators was challenged under the Utah ineligibility clause which prohibited
elections as well as appointments of legislators to public of(1921). This proposition was emphasized in New Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth. v. McCraine, 119 N.J. Super. 457, 292 A.2d 580 (1971):
[I]t is no answer to say that this public need was not constitutionally
envisioned 50 years ago. That Constitution, with which the law measures "public purposes" was created to endure 'for ages and was in-

tended therefore to be adapted for the many crises of human affairs
generated by changing social needs and demands for sensitivity towards them.

114. The possibility of successive increases is not a far-fetched idea. For
example, under the Federal Salary Act of 1967, 2 U.S.C. §§ 351-61 (1970), a
special Commission meets once every four years to determine whether adjustments are needed in federal salaries. The provisions of this statute call
for transmission of the Commission's recommendations to the President,
who in turn either adopts them as part of the Budget Message, modifies or
rejects them. Congress is given 30 days in which to "veto" the measure by
passage of a simple resolution in either House; otherwise, the President's
recommendations automatically take effect. Id.
During its second meeting in 1973, the Commission recommended a
25% increase in those salaries under its jurisdiction. President Nixon, however, in his Budget Message of January 1974, modified this suggestion to
provide for successive increases in these salaries of 7.5% in the years 1974,
1975, and 1976. Under the literal interpretation approach adopted by McBride, these increases would have disqualified every legislator, who was or
became a member of either House during these years, from appointments
to those offices within the Commission's jurisdiction.
115. 16 Utah 2d 61, 395 P.2d 829 (1964). In Shields, the Utah legislature

overhauled the salaries of 74 state offices by enacting a general salary increase bill. 16 Utah 2d at 63, 395 P.2d at 830. The following year, but before

their terms had expired, three members of the legislature became candidates for Governor and Secretary of State the offices of which had been
enhanced inter alia by the general salary increase.
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flce. 116 In holding that cost-of-living adjustments were not an in-

crease in the compensation of an office, 117 the court found three
factors to be persuasive. First, the small increases, granted as
they were to adjust salary ranges, did not lend themselves to
improperly influencing a legislator's action. l18 Second, the
countervailing policy considerations embodied within the clause
would be seriously infringed upon by literal application of the
provision's language. 119 Finally, the elective nature of the office
and the open forum of the campaign gave120adequate assurances
that the public's intention would prevail.
While the Shields court's factual findings were open to dispute, its analytical approach was exemplary. The court recognized the need to look beyond the language of constitutional
116. The Utah ineligibility clause, UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 7 provides:
No member of the Legislature, during the term for which he was

elected, shall be appointed or elected to any civil office of profit under
this State, which shall have been created, or the emoluments of which
shall have been increased, during the term for which he was elected.
117. 16 Utah 2d at 70, 395 P.2d at 835.
118. In reaching this first conclusion, the court stated that:
[t] hese relatively small increases . .. should properly be regarded as
just what they were, a moderate cost of living adjustment... in keeping with the steadily rising cost of living. Accordingly, it can be said
with assurance that this is not a situation which would lend itself to any
ulterior scheme by a legislator to set up a high paying sinecure to take
advantage of [that] which section 7 was designed to prevent. Nor is
there any reasonable likelihood that such raises would have induced
anyone to run for the offices in question who would not have otherwise
done so.
Id. at 64, 395 P.2d at 831 (footnotes omitted). What is most interesting about
the court's conclusion is its statement that the candidacy of these legislators was merely "coincidental." Id. The dissent was highly critical of this
finding. Id. at 72, 395 P.2d at 836 (Henroid, CJ., dissenting).
119. 16 Utah 2d at 70, 395 P.2d at 835. The first policy consideration examined by the Shields court was the infringement upon the right of the people to exercise their vote in a meaningful manner by disqualifying
candidates for office. Id. at 67, 395 P.2d at 832-33. The court likewise expressed concern over the hampering of the historical function of the legislature "as a proving ground in which our citizens obtain experience in
government service and the public learns of their qualifications for other
public offices." Id. In addition, the ability of legislators to deal objectively
with a proposed increase was found to be jeopardized if the fear of disqualification was hung over their heads. Id. at 71, 395 P.2d at 835. Ironically, the
court failed to perceive the same jeopardy to legislative objectivity if legislators were eligible to office which were benefited, despite its recognition of
the purpose of the provision. See note 153 and accompanying text infra.
120. 16 Utah 2d 61, 64, 395 P.2d 829, 831-32 (1964). According to George
Mason, a delegate from Virginia to the 1787 Convention, this consideration
should not be over-emphasized:
[i] f such a restriction should abridge the right of election, it is still necessary, as it will prevent the people from ruining themselves; and will
not the same causes here produce the same effects? I consider this
clause as the cornerstone on which our liberties depend ....
1 M. FARRAND, supra note 2, at 380-81.
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clauses in order to discern a provision's purpose, 121 and rejected
a literal application of the clause. 122 Moreover, the factors which
the court found determinative were the same concerns expressed by the drafters of the clause.
Shields, however, involved disqualification from elective office, and it is not altogether clear whether the court would have
reached the same conclusion if the office were appointive. At
12 3
least one subsequent case has highlighted this distinction.
What Shields does make clear is that each case must be handled
on an individual basis. The facts of each case should be examined in light of the concerns which gave rise to the ineligibility clause. Whether a legislator should be eligible for
appointment should depend on whether the purposes which the
124
clause seeks to promote would be served.
Effect of a Legislator's Resignation
Another issue which illuminates the difference between literal application of the ineligibility clause and the historical analysis approach advocated herein centers on whether a legislator's
resignation from the legislature would validate his appointment
to a newly created or enriched public office. Under either approach resignation after the office is created or enriched does
121. Shields v. Toronto, 16 Utah 2d at 63, 395 P.2d at 830. The court begins
its analysis by stating that "Ia constitutional] provision cannot properly be
regarded as something isolated and absolute but must be considered in
light of its background and the purpose it was designed to serve. . .

."

It

then cited to an earlier Utah Supreme Court opinion which analyzed the
provision in full, State ex rel. Jugler v. Grove, 102 Utah 41, 125 P.2d 807
(1942), and concluded that the provision's purpose is to prevent legislator's
from being unduly influenced.
122. 16 Utah 2d at 68, 395 P.2d at 833.
123. See Warwick v. State ex rel. Chance, 548 P.2d 384 (Alaska 1976) (rejecting the cost-of-living adjustment argument partly because the office was
appointive).
124. In hypothesizing the issue of whether the Shields decision should
apply to appointive offices, a number of similarities between elections and
appointments must be considered. For example, Governors, like Presidents
on the national level, have usually become their party's leader upon election and as such wield a great deal of influence in the election process. See
generally V.0. KEY, AMERICAN STATE PoLxIcs (2d ed. 1965). In addition,
confirmation proceedings have never been mere formalistic proceedings
and have therefore secured the same guarantees as the open forum of the
campaign. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1973, at 35, cols. 4-8 (discussing the
appointment and confirmation of William Saxbe as Attorney General). Furthermore, public outrage at a particular government action has in the past
served the same function as its vote at the ballot box. See WASH. CONST.
amend. 69 (passed as a result of public dissatisfaction with the holding of
the Washington Supreme Court in State ex rel. Anderson v. Chapman, 86
Wash. 2d 89, 543 P.2d 229 (1975) and allowing a legislator to receive appointment to office despite a salary increase during his term); see also note 17
supra.
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not alter the invalidity of the appointment. 125 In this factual situation, the appointment violates both the letter and the spirit of
the clause.
A much more difficult question arises when a legislator resigns his seat just prior to the creation or enrichment of an office, the so-called "evasions by resignation. ' 126 In its strictest
grammatical sense, the ineligibility clause appears to permit an
appointment under these circumstances. 127 It forbids appointments only to offices which have been createdorfavored during
the legislator's elected term. The words "during the legislator's
elected term" are seen as simply fixing the period of the legislator's disqualification once an appointive office is created or its
salary increased, 28 and not as referring to the entire term fixed
by law. 129 Thus, under literal application of the provision's language, as long as the legislator has resigned his office prior 130
to
creation or enrichment of the office, his appointment is valid.
125. See State ex rel. Ryan v. Boyd, 21 Wis. 210 (1866); accord, 42 Op.
A r'Y GEN. No. 36 (Jan. 3, 1969).
126. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 2, at 755; see note 133 infra. See, e.g., Stu-

dent Public Interest Research Group v. Byrne, No. A-165-80 (N.J., July 20,
1981) rev'g No. A-4384-79 (N.J. App. Div., March 25, 1981).

127. See State ex rel. Ryan v. Boyd, 21 Wis. 210 (1866). In Boyd, a legislator was elected to the office of county judge. Six days after the election, the
legislature, of which he was still a member, increased the salary of that office. In resolving the question of whether the increase in the emoluments to
the election subsequent but during the legislator's term disqualified him
from office, the court stated:
the increase of the emoluments of the office was during the time the
relator was a member of the legislature, but subsequent to his election
to the office of county judge. Does such a case come within the prohibition of the Constitution? It is not within the language of the provision,
according to its most naturalgrammaticalconstruction.
Id. at 212-13 (emphasis added).

128. See State ex rel. Ryan v. Boyd, 21 Wis. 210, 213 (1866) ("[T]he creation of the new office, or the increase in the emoluments of an old age, must
have taken place prior to the appointment or election of a [legislator] ... to
bring the case within the prohibition.").
129. See Vreeland v. Byrne, 72 N.J. 292, 370 A.2d 825 (1977). The majority
opinion stated that the phrase "during the term for which he shall have
been elected" was relevant in only two ways:
i]t fixes and limits the time span within which legislative action must
e taken if it is to be inhibiting, and similarly fixes and limits the time
span during which the resulting ineligibility shall persist ....

Specifi-

cally, it is clearly not related to the time of receipt or non-receipt of an
increase in emoluments.
130. State ex rel. Ryan v. Boyd, 21 Wis. at 213. Cf. Warwick v. State ex
rel. Chance, 548 P.2d 384 (Alaska 1976) (additional increase in the salary of
an office after the appointment of a legislator thereto does not render the
issue moot); Opinion of the Justices, 348 Mass. 803, 202 N.E.2d 234 (1964)
(decrease in salary, after the appointment was made, to pre-existing level is
without significance in determining the validity of the appointment). This
was the position taken by the legislator-appointee in Student Pub. Interest
Research Group v. Byrne, No. A-165-80 (N.J., July 20, 1981). The facts ap-
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This was the holding of the New Jersey Supreme Court in
Student Public Interest Research Group v. Byrne. 131 In Byrne,
the plaintiffs challenged the appointment of Assemblywoman
Barbara Curran under the ineligibility clause. Ms. Curran had
resigned her seat in the Assembly on June 23, 1980, and that
same day was nominated and confirmed as Commissioner of the
New Jersey Board of Public Utilities. 132 Eleven days prior to her
appointment, a bill was introduced in the legislature to increase,
inter alia, the salary of that office. One week after her appoint133
ment, Governor Byrne signed this bill into law.
Justice Clifford, writing for a unanimous court, relied on two
factors in upholding the appointment. First, the provision was
written in the future perfect tense, which, grammatically, required that the salary increase occur prior to the appointment. 134 Second, the court reasoned that if a subsequent
enactment could invalidate this appointment, then all appointments could be later invalidated at the whim of the legislature. 135 On the basis of such superficial analysis, the
appointment was upheld.
pear to demonstrate, however, the very abuses which the clause is designed
to prevent. See notes 135-39 and accompanying text infra.
131. No. A-165-80 (N.J., July 20, 1981) rev'g No. A-4384-79 (N.J. App. Div.,
March 25, 1981).
132. Id. at 3.
133. 1980 N.J. Laws ch. 73, § 1.
134. The court briefly discussed the history of the ineligibility clause, and
the debates surrounding its adoption, but proceeded to ignore these considerations in rendering its decision. Student Pub. Interest Research Group,
No. A-165-80, slip op. at 5-7 (N.J. July 20, 1981). Instead, the court focused on
the literal wording of the provision:
The future perfect tense identifies that which must occur before the future event. In the instant context this means the salary increase must
have been voted upon by the Assembly before Mrs. Curran's resignation from that body ....

That the disqualifying event must have oc-

curred "during such term" means only that it must also take place
during the legislator's current term of office.
Id. at 9-10 (emphasis in original).
135. Id. at 10-11. Rather than concentrate on the particular time sequence before it, the court focused on a hypothetical totally opposite to the
facts subjudice: "Suppose that an individual resigned from the Senate only
a few months after taking office ...

....

and promptly accepted appointment

Suppose further that three and a half years later, the Legislature in-

creased the emoluments of [that] office.. .

."

The defendant had raised

that same argument before the appellate court, but was unsuccessful in diverting that court's attention from the facts before it. Student Pub. Interest
Research Group v. Byrne, No. A-4384-79 (N.J. App. Div., March 25, 1981)
"But we do not decide here whether such result [referring to the hypothetical above] would inevitably follow from our ruling in this case ....

We

only determine the matter before us in its factual context." The appellate
court had found the appointment violative of the ineligibility clause. Id. at
3.
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Historical analysis, however, has indicated that the drafters
were primarily concerned with the ability of the executive to
manipulate appointments and influence legislative action, not
with the actual passage of statutes creating an office or increasing the salary of an existent one. 136 The attractiveness of public
appointments as inducements with which to corrupt legislators
137
caused the drafters to limit a legislator's eligibility to office.
Yet, their desire not to unduly restrict the executive's ability to
fill vacancies prodded them to disqualify legislators only from
appointments to certain offices because these presented the
most frequent abuses. 138 Moreover, the drafters were concerned
that legislators might try to evade the prohibition by resigning
their seats prior to passage of the disqualifying statute. In order
to prevent this occurrence, the drafters included the phrase
139
"during his elected term."
The potential for abuse illustrated by the facts in Byrne requires that appointments such as Commissioner Curran's be invalidated under the ineligibility clause. The appearance of
impropriety, created by a legislator's resignation one week
before passage of the disqualifying salary increase, runs counter
to the spirit of the provision. 14° Moreover, if legislators are allowed to resign their seats after a salary increase is proposed
but prior to its enactment, they become susceptible to the same
abuses which gave rise to the ineligibility clause. This permits
the executive to manipulate the appointive process and thereby
influence legislative action.
Moreover, invalidating an appointment made under facts
such as those in Byrne, does not imply that all appointments are
susceptible to challenge because of later salary increases.
Where the resignation occurs prior to the introduction of a bill to
create or favor an office, or where the time sequence does not
136. See Pollitt, supra note 36, at 132. The limitation on offices created or

enriched by the legislature during that term served as a compromise between those who favored disqualification in all cases, and those who pre-

ferred
137.
138.
139.

eligibility at all times.
See notes 49-56 and accompanying text supra.
See Pollitt, supra note 36, at 132.
21 Op. Arr'y GEN. 211 (1895). Contra, 42 Op. ATr'y GEN. No. 36 (Jan.

3, 1969). George Mason of Virginia stressed the need for language precluding an appointment during the entire elected term in order to "guard
against evasion by resignation." 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 2, at 755.
140. The appellate court in Byrne, which unanimously invalidated the
appointment, found the appearance of impropriety especially influential.
While that court did not completely adopt the thesis presented herein, it
was sensitive to the problems that result from allowing legislatures to
evade the clause's proscription by resigning just prior to passage of the salary increase. Student Pub. Interest Research Group v. Byrne, No. A-438479, slip op. at 507 (N.J. App. Div., March 25, 1981).
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cast the suspicious cloud existent in Byrne, the purpose of the
provision would not be served by invalidating the appointment.
Moreover, the New Jersey Supreme Court was incorrect in extending the precise factual issue to the point of absurdity by hypothesizing a situation in which the subsequent salary increase
occurs three and one half years later. 14 1 The principles of constitutional interpretation dictate that each case should be decided as it appears, and the court should not reach out to decide
issues not presently before it. While invalidating an appointment on the basis of a salary increase may seem harsh, any
other result in a case such as Byrne would clearly contravene
the purpose of the provision.
CONCLUSION
The ineligibility clause, as it first appeared, was a compromise. It was aimed at protecting the independence of legislative
action from being subverted by abuses of the appointive power,
without absolutely disqualifying legislators from appointive office. In many states, the need to balance these considerations
was expressly recognized when the provision was adopted. In
others, however, this realization came only after dissatisfaction
with various attempts to curb the undesirable influences of avarice and ambition through alternative measures.
In determining the validity of an appointment under the ineligibility clause, the court must remember that more than an
appointment is at stake; the independence of legislative action
and the separation of powers are being challenged. Because of
the integral part these doctrines play in our governmental organization, an historical analysis of the provision's purpose
must be preferred over a literal application of its words. As explained by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, this is the essence of judicial
review. 142
To simply apply the dictionary meaning of the provision's
language, without reference to the abuses which spawned those
words, enforces the form of the ineligibility clause without re141. The inappropriateness of the court's hypothesizing beyond the instant facts is further demonstrated by considering the other disqualifying
event delineated in the clause. It is impossible for a subsequent enactment
to affect the appointment of a legislator to a newly created office except in a
situation similar to Byrne. The court's opinion, hoWever, is now binding authority in New Jersey to permit a legislator to resign his seat in anticipation
of (e.g. subsequent to the introduction of a bill for) the creation of an office,
and accept the appointment to that office. Thus, both proscriptions of the
ineligibility clause now can be evaded by resignation in New Jersey. See
Trenton Times, July 24, 1981, at 5, col. 2.
142. F. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47
COLUM. L. REV. 527 (1947).
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gard to its substance. It ignores the compromise between the
143
countervailing public policies which the clause embodies.
Moreover, such literal application of the clause can serve to limit
its scope, or extend it beyond the intentions of the drafters. In a
judicial system such as ours, which operates under the rule of
stare decisis and depends so heavily on the full airing of all arguments surrounding an issue, such superficial analysis would
surely be anomalous.
Paul R. Lieggi

143. Madison, whose proposal ultimately became the ineligibility clause,
see notes 54-56 and accompanying text supra, described the clause as "a
middle ground between eligibility in all cases and an absolute disqualification in all cases." Pollitt, supra note 29, at 116. This position balanced, on
the one hand, the fears of George Mason that ". . . by the sole power of
appointing the increased officers of government, corruption [would pervade] every village in the [Union]," 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 2, at 380-81,
and on the other, the optimism of Alexander Hamilton that the "prevailing
will be used for the public benefit.
passions [of ] ambition and interest ....
Id. at 381-82.

